A federal court has struck out a claim brought by two plaintiffs against the Crown, represented by Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO), finding it “plain and obvious” that the matter falls outside the court’s jurisdiction and that no reasonable cause of action was disclosed for the second plaintiff.
The ruling removes both plaintiffs’ claims in their entirety and highlights the challenges public sector employees face when attempting to litigate workplace disputes in court.
J.C., the first plaintiff, is a member of a federal union governed by the Applied Science and Patent Examination Group Agreement (Collective Agreement). M.C., the second plaintiff and J.C.’s spouse, is a professional engineer. In their statement of claim, the plaintiffs alleged breaches of the Charter and intentional or negligent infliction of mental suffering.
The Crown and W.M. filed a motion to strike under Rule 221(1)(a) of the Federal Courts Rules, arguing that the claim “discloses no reasonable cause of action.” They further submitted that section 236 of the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations Act (FPSLRA) bars the court from adjudicating claims by a federal public service employee when they arise out of that employee’s terms and conditions of employment. The court agreed, stating that “it is plain and obvious…that this Court lacks jurisdiction” over J.C.’s claim.
Investigation, leave, and grievance
The dispute stems from a workplace misconduct investigation launched by the DFO against J.C. in 2015. He was asked to refrain from attending his regular office, instead working from home until 2022. In 2017, J.C. received authorization from the DFO to pursue full-time doctoral studies “on full salary and benefits” pursuant to article 17.20(a) of the Collective Agreement.
The plaintiffs allege that this arrangement formed a separate agreement (the “2017 Agreement”) entirely distinct from the Collective Agreement.
In June 2022, the DFO concluded its investigation, finding that J.C. had engaged in workplace violence but imposing no disciplinary action. In November 2022, W.M. informed J.C. that the DFO would no longer support his doctoral studies. J.C. was to return to work in a different office space, which he claims led him to experience psychological distress and take paid sick leave. By May 2024, J.C. had exhausted his paid sick leave, followed by his vacation leave in September 2024. Since then, he has been on unpaid sick leave.
In August 2024, J.C. filed a grievance under section 208 of the FPSLRA, which remains in abeyance. The following month, J.C. and M.C. filed their statement of claim, alleging Charter breaches and intentional or negligent infliction of mental suffering. The defendants moved to strike the statement of claim on the grounds that section 236 of the FPSLRA is a “complete bar” to J.C.’s claim. They also argued that M.C. failed to plead material facts necessary to support a viable tort claim.
Lack of jurisdiction for first plaintiff’s claim
The court ruled that the claim by J.C. “must be struck on jurisdictional grounds,” stating the essence of the dispute falls under “terms or conditions of employment” and is therefore barred by section 236 of the FPSLRA. That provision requires federal public sector employees with employment-related disputes to pursue remedies through the grievance process rather than in the courts. The court quoted from a recent appellate decision, which stressed that it is the “essential character” of the dispute, not its label or the specific legal cause of action, that triggers the bar in section 236.
Central to J.C.’s argument was the position that the 2017 Agreement governing his doctoral studies replaced the Collective Agreement and fell outside the FPSLRA. However, the court rejected that position, noting: “The First Plaintiff was authorized to pursue a PhD pursuant to article 17.20(a) of the Collective Agreement … I therefore do not find that a new agreement was formed.” Furthermore, the court found that the relief sought by J.C. clearly stretched back to alleged harms beginning in 2015, well before his doctoral studies began.
The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ invocation of so-called “whistleblower” cases, finding them inapplicable because they did not involve section 236 of the FPSLRA and involved markedly different fact situations. It also dismissed arguments related to alleged institutional bias, stating there was insufficient evidence to override the statutory bar to court proceedings. “[T]he onus is on a plaintiff to demonstrate that the integrity of internal recourse mechanisms is compromised,” the court wrote, concluding that J.C. “must therefore ‘seek redress by way of grievance.’”
Second plaintiff’s claim struck for lack of reasonable cause of action
The court also struck M.C.’s claim for intentional or negligent infliction of mental suffering, finding that the statement of claim did not meet the required legal tests. For intentional infliction of mental suffering, there must be “(1) flagrant or outrageous conduct; (2) calculated to produce harm; and (3) resulting in a visible and provable illness.” The court concluded there were no “material facts to demonstrate that the Defendants’ actions were calculated to harm the Second Plaintiff.”
Regarding negligent infliction of mental suffering, the court highlighted the requirement to establish a recognized duty of care, stating that “there is no established duty of care between a federal employer and the family member of a federal employee of the nature alleged.” The statement of claim, according to the ruling, contained only general references to M.C. as being harmed “by extension,” failing to demonstrate the “closeness of the relationship” needed to support a new duty of care.
Because the plaintiffs’ statement of claim was struck in its entirety, the court did not address the defendants’ alternative request for an extension of time to file a statement of defence. The court ordered costs in favour of the defendants.
For more information, see Craig v. Canada (Fisheries and Oceans), 2024 FC 2004 (CanLII).
