The Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario has dismissed a complaint brought by a former worker against a youth outreach centre and its director, finding the allegations were filed outside the time limits set out in the Human Rights Code and failed to establish any breach of the Code within the tribunal’s jurisdiction.
In a written decision, the tribunal found that C.O.’s application against the Refuge Youth Outreach Centre and its director, C.K., was untimely under section 34(1) of the Code. The tribunal also ruled that the single allegation dated within the limitation period lacked a factual foundation that could support an inference of reprisal under section 8 of the Code.
“I find the applicant’s only timely allegation of reprisal in March of 2024, fails to provide a factual basis that could constitute a breach of the Code and therefore, cannot form part of a series of incidents with the applicant’s other allegations, all of which are untimely,” the tribunal wrote.
Allegations related to termination and withheld mail
C.O. alleged that he experienced discriminatory remarks and sexual harassment in the course of his employment with the Refuge Youth Outreach Centre. These incidents were said to have occurred in or around November 2022 and were reported to the organization at that time. He further alleged that after refusing to sign a new service contract, his employment was terminated on or around November 16, 2022. This was characterized by the applicant as an act of reprisal.
All of these events took place more than one year prior to the filing of the application on Sept. 4, 2024. The tribunal noted that unless the claim involves a series of incidents culminating in a final event within the limitation period, the Code’s one-year rule under section 34(1) would bar the application.
The only event dated within the year prior to the application involved the handling of the applicant’s mail. C.O. claimed that after his termination, staff at the organization had routinely notified him when mail was delivered in his name. However, between June 2023 and March 2024, he said that the respondents ceased this courtesy as a form of retaliation for his earlier human rights complaint.
He alleged that this resulted in him missing time-sensitive matters, and considered it a reprisal for asserting his rights under the Code.
But the tribunal disagreed that this action met the test for reprisal set out in Noble v. York University, which requires: (a) an action or threat against the applicant; (b) a connection between that action and the exercise of Code rights; and (c) an intention to retaliate.
“The allegation of reprisal is speculative, based entirely on the applicant’s own belief, and is on its face, inconsistent with the applicant’s own factual account,” the decision stated.
No basis for reprisal under Code
The tribunal found that failing to continue a courtesy—especially one not required by law or agreement—did not amount to an adverse action.
“While I accept that the delayed receipt of his mail prejudiced the applicant, an inference that this prejudice was caused by an action or inaction on the part of the respondents is in my view, not possible in the circumstances,” the tribunal wrote.
The tribunal noted that C.O. offered no evidence to support his assertion that the respondents intended to retaliate. Moreover, the decision observed that the organization proactively contacted the applicant on March 1, 2024, to inform him of mail, despite him not requesting such contact.
“That the respondents proactively and without solicitation from the applicant, notified him in March of 2024, that he had mail to be collected, is inconsistent with the applicant’s theory that the respondents intended to retaliate by withholding his mail,” the tribunal stated.
The tribunal found the applicant failed to plead any facts that could support any of the three requirements to establish a reprisal claim under the Code.
Delay not incurred in good faith
The tribunal also considered whether the application could proceed under section 34(2) of the Code, which allows for late applications where the delay was incurred in good faith and no substantial prejudice would result.
C.O. said his delay of more than nine months was due to a series of personal challenges, including facing deportation, his uncle’s death, his spouse’s medical issues, charges laid by an abusive landlord, and proceedings at the Landlord and Tenant Board.
The tribunal acknowledged the seriousness of these issues but found that they did not amount to good faith delay within the meaning of the Code.
“The Tribunal’s case law sets a relatively high bar for applicants seeking to provide a ‘good faith’ explanation for not pursuing their Code claim in a timely way,” the tribunal noted, citing Miller and Trowsse v. Ontario (Transportation).
While the applicant’s life circumstances were difficult, the tribunal concluded they did not demonstrate that he had acted with all due diligence in pursuing his rights.
“That the applicant was able to participate in his landlord and tenant issues and deal with mischief charges, demonstrates that during the relevant period, he was capable of participating in legal proceedings but did not pursue his Application,” the decision stated.
As a result, the tribunal found it unnecessary to consider whether the respondents would have been prejudiced by the delay.
For more information, see Ocheli v. The Refuge Youth Outreach Centre, 2025 HRTO 781 (CanLII).
