An Alberta court has partially overturned decisions to relieve three Edmonton police officers from duty without pay, sending one matter back for reconsideration while confirming the other two. The officers were involved in separate incidents of misconduct, including attending and speaking at a Freedom Convoy gathering; assaulting a civilian and other officers while off-duty; and creating a toxic, sexualized work environment.
The ruling examines how police services can invoke “exceptional circumstances” to justify suspensions without pay, a question of intense interest for human resources and employment law professionals tasked with balancing employer obligations, employee rights, and public trust.
In a single judgment, the court dealt with three separate applications for judicial review challenging a police commission’s confirmation of the officers’ relief-from-duty orders. Each officer — identified here as R.A., S.C. and M.C. — had faced separate allegations of misconduct. The police chief imposed suspensions without pay, citing risks to public confidence, internal discipline and the force’s reputation. The court found the commission’s review to be reasonable in two of the cases but sent R.A.’s matter back for a fresh look.
Alleged misconduct and relief-from-duty framework
All three officers were served with Notices of Relief From Duty Without Pay, each referencing sections of the province’s police service regulation. Under the regulation, a chief can relieve an officer from duty with or without pay if there are reasonable grounds to suspect contraventions, including insubordination, breach of confidence, discreditable conduct, unlawful exercise of authority or other forms of misconduct.
If relieved without pay, those directions must be confirmed within 30 days by the police commission. The commission’s role is limited to deciding if it was reasonable for the chief to conclude that “exceptional circumstances” justified relief without pay.
The standard of review at both the commission and the court level was reasonableness. This meant the commission had to determine if the chief’s belief in each case fell within a range of possible acceptable outcomes, based on the evidence. The court, in turn, had to decide if the commission’s confirmation decisions showed “transparent, intelligible and justifiable” reasoning.
Officer one: Balancing free expression against duty
R.A. is a senior member who initially refused to complete a mandatory COVID-19 vaccine disclosure survey. He eventually complied but was later seen attending and speaking at a Freedom Convoy gathering. According to the commission’s decision, R.A. introduced himself as a serving police member and gave advice on the “lawful placement” of protesters and RCMP officers. The chief believed these actions could undermine public confidence and the force’s role in enforcing public health measures.
R.A. argued that his address did not take place at the specific blockade site and that his Charter rights to freedom of expression were not properly balanced against the police service’s interests.
The commission found it was “not a critical distinction” if he spoke in a location nearby or at the main blockade, so long as the gathering was in support of that blockade. It also noted that “the right to freedom of expression is not unlimited,” particularly when an officer invokes police status in a heated public matter.
The court, however, deemed the commission’s reliance on certain contested facts—like whether R.A. actually addressed blockade participants—to be insufficiently explained. It found the chief’s reasons “were based on a possible misapprehension of the facts and evidence,” and that “the Commission ought to have refused to confirm the Chief’s decision.” As a result, R.A.’s judicial review application was allowed, and his case was sent back to the commission for a fresh determination.
Officer two: Altercation and alleged deceit
S.C. was off duty when he confronted two individuals in a parking lot, mistakenly believing they had tampered with his spouse’s vehicle. The chief alleged S.C. escalated the incident without justification, assaulted one civilian and shoved two responding on-duty officers. S.C. was later charged criminally with assault and assaulting a police officer.
In the Notice, the chief pointed to CCTV and eyewitness evidence, including statements from two uniformed officers who witnessed the altercation. The chief also flagged alleged inconsistencies in S.C.’s official report, suggesting he tried to “conceal [his] assaultive misconduct” by misrepresenting events.
Although one commissioner dissented — citing S.C.’s explanation about facing a knife drawn by the other individual — the commission’s majority confirmed the chief’s direction.
The majority agreed that “multiple allegations of assault on their own are sufficient” to constitute exceptional circumstances and that S.C.’s version of events lacked credibility when measured against the video and eyewitness accounts.
On judicial review, the court upheld the commission’s confirmation. It found “the reasons given by the Chief giving rise to his belief that exceptional circumstances existed … were clear, intelligible and justifiable,” and the commission’s approach to endorsing those reasons did not amount to “unwarranted deference.”
Officer three: Workplace harassment and repeated misconduct
M.C., a long-serving sergeant and supervisor, was accused of fostering a “toxic” work environment with repeated sexual comments and unprofessional behaviour toward subordinates in an emergency communications unit. An external investigation substantiated concerns from multiple dispatchers, including overtly sexual remarks, lewd references and stories of past sexual encounters.
For example, during one conversation with a dispatcher and another co-worker he described how he was tied up at his bachelor party by a stripper who who shaved his pubic hair and performed oral sex. In another incident, he told that same dispatcher that “she should switch her personal lash business to waxing because ‘there is a lot of money in vaginas.'”
That dispatcher, who complained about those incidents and others, died by suicide shortly after confirming her account, though she declined to press a formal complaint.
M.C. admitted to many of the comments or said he could not recall making them but did not deny them outright. The chief noted that M.C. had previously been found to have harassed another employee and had undergone remedial training. Citing these repeated offences, the chief wrote, “Your alleged conduct … calls into question your governability, and in my opinion damages the morale and maintenance of discipline within the EPS.”
Unlike R.A.’s case, the court upheld the commission’s confirmation of M.C.’s relief from duty without pay. While it acknowledged some inaccuracies in the Notice — such as whether M.C. was previously “disciplined” or merely required to take training — it ruled that those mistakes did not amount to “fatal flaws in overarching logic.” The court concluded the commission was entitled to find that M.C.’s alleged conduct “would severely undermine internal accountability or discipline within EPS … if [he] were not relieved from duty without pay.”
Next steps
The court allowed R.A.’s judicial review application, returning his matter to the commission for reconsideration. The challenges brought by S.C. and M.C. were dismissed, meaning their relief-from-duty orders remain in effect. All three officers, according to information provided to the court, have since left the service. Whether the commission can still revisit R.A.’s file will hinge on its own jurisdictional rules.
For more information, see Abbott v Chief of Police, 2025 ABKB 2 (CanLII).
