A defamation dispute between the Prince Albert Golf and Curling Club and its former general manager returned mixed results on appeal, after the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal allowed part of the employee’s claim to stand while striking other portions.
The court agreed some aspects of the general manager’s lawsuit against the club and K.T., the chair of the board of directors, disclosed a plausible defamation claim. Other portions, however, were deemed too vague to proceed.
In the end, the GM’s argument that the club is liable for third-party “republication” of alleged defamatory statements was restored, but his case against K.T. personally was struck in its current form, with the court granting him leave to amend his pleadings to fix the deficiencies.
The GM — identified here as M.S. — worked at the club for about four years. After the board of directors terminated his employment, M.S. sued for wrongful dismissal and defamation. His legal filings stated that both the Club and K.T. “falsely and maliciously published words defamatory” of him, including allegations that he had stolen money from the organization.
The Club and K.T. asked the lower court to strike parts of M.S.’s statement of claim for not describing a “reasonable cause of action,” meaning the allegations were either too vague or did not show a viable claim in defamation. The lower court agreed in part: it removed several paragraphs, effectively eliminating K.T. as a personal defendant and narrowing M.S.’s republication allegations. M.S. appealed, arguing the court should have taken a more flexible approach to pleadings in a defamation action.
In its reasons, the appellate court emphasized that defamation claims must detail the allegedly defamatory words, identify how they refer to the plaintiff, and show they were published to a person other than the plaintiff. However, modern jurisprudence allows some leniency where a plaintiff cannot know all particulars. The test is whether the statement of claim, combined with any replies to demands for particulars, gives defendants enough information to understand the case and prepare a defence.
“A claim might still be allowed to stand if the pleading nonetheless identifies the offending communication with sufficient precision and particularity,” the court said, quoting prior case law.
According to the appeal ruling, M.S.’s claim adequately pleaded the main elements of defamation against the club. He alleged board members implied he had stolen funds by repeatedly referring to an overpayment issue and by describing him as “not trustworthy,” “a thief,” and someone who had “fraudulently stolen” from the club.
These details were found in key paragraphs that were allowed to remain. The court also acknowledged a specific email from the Club sent to its membership, which M.S. claimed carried the innuendo that he was dishonest.
Republication restored
One contested part of M.S.’s lawsuit involved “republication” of the alleged defamatory remarks by third parties. Generally, each repetition or republication of a defamatory statement is considered a separate incident, so the original speaker is not automatically liable for what others repeat — unless certain exceptions apply.
Those exceptions include situations where the original publisher intended or authorized the republication, where a moral or legal duty compelled it, or where it was the “natural and probable” result of the initial defamation.
The lower court struck M.S.’s references to republication, finding he had not pleaded facts to connect the club’s remarks with the repetition by others. It concluded there was no specific allegation that the club had authorized the repetition or that republication was “natural and probable.” On appeal, however, M.S. pointed to further particulars he gave when responding to a demand for details, arguing those documents should have been considered.
The appellate court agreed it was an error not to weigh the additional information. M.S. had named at least two individuals who, he said, repeated the defamatory statements. While the court acknowledged the pleadings were not perfectly drafted, it emphasized the “stringent” standard for striking claims. The court said it was “not plain and obvious” that M.S.’s attempt to hold the club liable for republication must fail. As a result, it reinstated paragraphs of the defamation claim that revolve around statements repeated by third parties.
No personal claim against board chair as pleaded
While M.S. succeeded in restoring the republication aspect, he could not revive his defamation claim against K.T. personally in its current form. The appellate court found M.S. had not shown how K.T. acted in a separate “personal capacity,” rather than solely as a club representative.
In defamation suits, officers or directors can be personally liable if they commit a tort themselves or pursue a personal interest separate from that of the corporation. Yet, such liability demands precise pleadings showing how the individual’s acts were distinct from their corporate role.
In M.S.’s statement of claim, the allegations against the club and K.T. were almost identical. M.S. used the terms “falsely and maliciously,” but did not set out how K.T. acted outside the scope of his official position as chair of the board. The court wrote:
“It is not enough to plead undifferentiated allegations against the corporation and its directors and employees,” and concluded the claim was properly struck for failing to name the words or actions that could expose K.T. to independent liability.
Despite agreeing the strike was justified, the appellate court granted M.S. the right to apply to amend his pleadings. It explained that courts typically allow plaintiffs an opportunity to fix defects in a statement of claim if there is a reasonable prospect the flaws can be remedied.
Because M.S. had successfully pleaded defamation against the Club, the court said it was fair to let him try to clarify which statements, if any, K.T. might have made in a capacity outside his corporate role.
Implications for hr and employment counsel
From a process standpoint, the decision underscores how defamation pleadings must include material facts that allow defendants to respond fully. While the court adopted a “more flexible approach” to unknown details — such as specific dates or exact words overheard by other parties — plaintiffs cannot rely on bare assertions.
Where corporate officers or directors are individually named, a statement of claim must show how that person went beyond their role with the organization and engaged in tortious conduct of their own.
The end result is a partial win for both sides. The club still faces the core defamation claim and M.S.’s republication argument has been restored, broadening the scope of statements at issue. On the other hand, portions of M.S.’s claim remain struck, and K.T. is effectively removed as a personal defendant unless and until M.S. supplies further factual detail.
No order was made for costs, given each side’s mixed success.
For more information, see Sawatzky v Prince Albert Golf and Curling Club Inc., 2025 SKCA 16 (CanLII).
