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Vancity’s disclosure request at screening stage in human rights retaliation case rejected

by HR Law Canada

The British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal has denied Vancouver City Savings Credit Union’s request for disclosure of legal advice documents from a former employee at the screening stage of her retaliation complaint, underscoring the exceptional nature of granting disclosure before a full hearing.

The dispute arises from M.L.Y.S.’s retaliation complaint, alleging the credit union — commonly known as Vancity — breached Section 43 of the Human Rights Code by sabotaging her subsequent employment opportunities after her dismissal in September 2020.

M.L.Y.S. filed her complaint outside the statutory timeframe, prompting the tribunal to seek submissions from both parties regarding whether it should exercise discretion to accept the late-filed complaint. In response, M.L.Y.S. claimed poor legal advice contributed to the delay. The credit union, seeking to challenge this new assertion, requested disclosure of all related legal documents.

Background of retaliation allegations

M.L.Y.S.’s retaliation complaint includes several specific allegations:

  • After her dismissal in 2020, a credit union representative accused her of being “greedy.”
  • Upon notifying the credit union of her intent to file a human rights complaint in April and May 2021, a representative implied she would regret pursuing the matter.
  • Shortly afterward, her new employer became hostile, issuing warnings and ultimately recommending she resign, despite initial positive interactions.
  • Another prospective employer, whose hiring manager had ties to the credit union, declined to hire her, citing past connections and ongoing relationships with former credit union colleagues.

She argued the timing and circumstances strongly indicated retaliation by the credit union.

Legal advice cited as reason for late filing

Initially, the tribunal accepted her late-filed complaint, but later granted the credit union’s reconsideration request. The credit union argued it hadn’t had an opportunity to respond to M.L.Y.S.’s new explanation that erroneous legal advice contributed to the late filing.

In her submissions, M.L.Y.S. claimed:

  • Her initial counsel failed to advise her properly regarding retaliation and instead pursued a wrongful dismissal claim.
  • She experienced resistance from her first counsel when she later sought to file a retaliation complaint, prompting her to consult another law firm.
  • Subsequent counsel advised immediate filing of the retaliation complaint, which she claims her first lawyer resisted due to concerns over admitting oversight.

Tribunal’s reasoning on disclosure

The credit union requested comprehensive disclosure of documents, including emails, letters, and legal opinions related to M.L.Y.S.’s legal advice from September 28, 2020, to April 6, 2023, arguing it was crucial for fairness and preparation.

However, the tribunal rejected this request, emphasizing:

  • Disclosure obligations are generally not applied at the screening stage of a human rights complaint.
  • Granting such a request at this stage would likely introduce delays contrary to the principles of timeliness and fairness.
  • The tribunal’s role at the screening stage does not involve determining factual accuracy or credibility, but rather assessing whether it is in the public interest to accept a late-filed complaint.

Citing two key Court of Appeal decisions—Mzite (2014) and The Parent (2020)—the tribunal stated that the reason for delay, while considered, is not the sole determining factor nor does it necessitate proof of incorrect legal advice or full disclosure of privileged communications.

The tribunal further clarified that under current case law, complainants relying on erroneous legal advice must merely show they acted timely in seeking legal counsel, provide evidence of their understanding of the advice, and demonstrate diligence despite any misunderstandings.

Tribunal emphasizes “exceptional” nature of screening-stage disclosure

Acknowledging the “exceptional” nature of disclosure at this stage, the tribunal noted the credit union failed to demonstrate extraordinary circumstances warranting such relief. Moreover, it found that the credit union could sufficiently address the issues raised without full disclosure, given that the tribunal’s screening decision does not depend on factual findings but rather discretionary judgment.

The credit union was granted a 14-day extension to file further submissions without the requested disclosure.

For more information, see Sun v. Vancouver City Savings Credit Union (No. 3), 2025 BCHRT 25 (CanLII).

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