The Ontario Superior Court has upheld a Human Rights Tribunal decision dismissing a male educational assistant’s claim that he was fired due to sex discrimination, finding no evidence to support his allegations beyond personal beliefs and speculation.
P.T. worked as an educational assistant with the Durham District School Board and was terminated during his 70-day probationary period in December 2018. The employer cited four performance concerns: inappropriate interactions with female students, arriving late to work, sleeping in class, and engaging in a heated confrontation with a male high-needs student.
T. filed a complaint with the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, claiming he was discriminated against because of his sex and that his termination was retaliation for asking the employer to address student gossip and rumours about him. He also argued the employer’s failure to address the rumours constituted sexual harassment.
Tribunal finds no evidence of discrimination
The tribunal dismissed T.’s application after a summary hearing, concluding it had no reasonable prospect of success. The tribunal found that even accepting all of T.’s allegations as true, he couldn’t point to any evidence connecting the employer’s actions to his sex as a protected ground under the Human Rights Code.
The tribunal stated: “Even if I assume that the allegations made by the applicant are true, the applicant did not, in their submissions made in the hearing, point to any evidence in their possession, or that may reasonably be available to them, to indicate that any of the actions of the respondent were connected to the Code ground of sex.”
The tribunal noted that T. “strongly and genuinely believes that an injustice was done to them. However, the applicant did not point the Tribunal to any evidence to support a link between the applicant’s ground and the respondent’s actions.” The decision emphasized that T. “did not point to any evidence to support their belief that a female in the same situation would have been treated differently by the respondent.”
Sexual harassment and reprisal claims also fail
Although T. didn’t initially allege sexual harassment in his application, the tribunal considered this claim and found it was “speculative and vague.” The tribunal concluded T. “did not point to any evidence to support their allegation of sexual harassment” and “did not provide any particulars relevant to their allegation of sexual harassment.”
Regarding T.’s reprisal claim, the tribunal found he “did not point to any evidence that could substantiate or support their belief that the respondent terminated their employment because the applicant raised a concern relevant to alleged gossip amongst students.” The tribunal concluded: “the applicant’s allegation is merely an assertion that a reprisal took place. In the absence of any evidence to support this assertion, there is no reasonable prospect that the applicant would be able to demonstrate an intent to reprise on behalf of the respondent.”
Court rejects judicial review application
T. applied for judicial review, asking the Superior Court to quash the tribunal’s decision and send the matter back for consideration on its merits. The court applied the reasonableness standard of review, noting that the Human Rights Tribunal is “a highly specialized expert tribunal that is entitled to the highest degree of deference on judicial review.”
The court rejected T.’s arguments that the tribunal made three key errors: failing to presume the truth of his factual assertions, erroneously requiring sex to be the sole reason for adverse treatment rather than just a factor, and failing to properly consider evidence while relying on speculation and belief.
Tribunal properly distinguished facts from assumptions
The court found the tribunal properly distinguished between accepting alleged facts and accepting assumptions about unfair treatment. The tribunal had stated: “accepting the facts alleged by the applicant does not include accepting the applicant’s assumptions about why they were treated unfairly.”
The court noted the tribunal didn’t require sex discrimination to be the sole cause of adverse treatment, but rather found “no evidence that the protected ground of sex was a factor in any way” in T.’s treatment.
Claims characterized as stereotypes and social violence
The court observed that T.’s claim centered on his belief he was fired because of “assumptions” and “stereotypes” about men, describing the reasons for his termination as “MeToo fantasy” and “social violence against men.” However, the court found T. “pointed to no evidence that he was fired for discriminatory reasons or reprised against because of his sex or that he was treated differently than a female employee in the same situation.”
New evidence arguments fail
T. argued that new information was available, including claims that the union didn’t provide fair representation and that the employer falsely stated he inappropriately touched students. The court found these arguments didn’t address the tribunal’s basis for dismissal — the lack of evidence supporting discrimination allegations.
The court noted T. was “improperly” trying to relitigate arguments about duty of fair representation that were dismissed at the tribunal and belonged before the Ontario Labour Relations Board.
Decision deemed reasonable
Applying the Supreme Court of Canada‘s framework from Canada v. Vavilov, the court found the tribunal’s decision was “based on an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis” and justified by the facts and law. The court emphasized that T. bore “the heavy burden of satisfying the court that there are sufficiently serious shortcomings in the decision to warrant quashing it.”
The court concluded: “The Tribunal’s reasoning is logical and justifies its conclusions. As required by its governing caselaw, the Decision assumes the facts alleged to be true, and closely analyzed whether [T.] pointed to any evidence that supports his assertion of discrimination. There was no such evidence.”
T. was ordered to pay $6,000 in costs to the school board. The tribunal and union didn’t seek costs.
For more information, see Tamming v. Durham District School Board, 2025 ONSC 3118 (CanLII).
