The Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario has dismissed an application against Park’N Fly from a former worker who alleged discrimination due to disability.
The tribunal concluded that the matter had already been sufficiently addressed in a separate civil court proceeding, invoking section 34(11) of the Ontario Human Rights Code to bar the claim.
R.R. argued that Park’N Fly terminated his employment unfairly, influenced by his alleged disability. The tribunal’s decision follows years of procedural deferrals and legal maneuvering, culminating in a final determination that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction over the case.
The origins of the case date back to early 2017 when R.R. initially filed a Plaintiff’s Claim with the Small Claims Court. Park’N Fly requested a deferral from the tribunal, which was granted on May 12, 2017, pending the outcome of the small claims proceedings. This interim decision highlighted that the facts and issues in the small claims case overlapped significantly with those presented to the tribunal.
The small claims court dismissed R.R.’s claim on May 13, 2019, a decision which he promptly appealed. Throughout the prolonged appeals process, the tribunal kept abreast of the case’s status, sending periodic updates and requests for information to R.R. In 2023, new counsel for Park’N Fly informed the tribunal of the 2019 dismissal, prompting further scrutiny of the case’s progression.
In June 2024, the tribunal requested R.R. to clarify the status of his appeal and to provide any relevant documentation. Despite this, R.R. failed to address the tribunal’s concerns, submitting instead a request to continue deferring the matter. Park’N Fly opposed this, advocating for dismissal based on the provisions of section 34(11)(b) of the Code.
The tribunal’s analysis rested heavily on established jurisprudence from Ontario’s higher courts, which emphasize section 34(11) as a mandatory bar to concurrent tribunal proceedings when a civil case addresses the same issues. Referencing cases such as Ingram v. Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario and Zheng v. G4S Secure Solutions (Canada) Ltd, the tribunal underscored the intent to avoid duplicative legal processes.
Adjudicator Denise Ghanam highlighted that R.R.’s civil claim, despite not explicitly invoking section 46.1 of the Code, sought remedies analogous to those in his tribunal application. The civil court had already examined and dismissed his allegations of wrongful termination and disability discrimination, noting in its decision:
“The Applicant failed to establish that discrimination formed any part in the reasons for the termination of his employment. At no time did (R.R.) indicate, suggest, imply or otherwise demonstrate to anyone at Park’N Fly that he suffered from or had any form of disability.”
This finding by the civil court, coupled with R.R.’s decision to bifurcate his claims between the civil court and the tribunal, led to a determination of “abuse of process.” The civil court judge expressed that R.R. should have consolidated his claims before the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, capable of addressing both wrongful dismissal and human rights allegations comprehensively.
Citing the Supreme Court of Canada’s ruling in Workers Compensation Board v. Figliola, the tribunal reiterated that attempting to re-litigate human rights claims after a civil court decision is impermissible. The tribunal noted:
“Having decided to go to court, relying on the same impugned actions as those alleged to have been discriminatory in a complaint to the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario means that the Court is in a position to deal with the matter fully, including any allegation of discrimination. In short, you do not get two kicks at the same set of facts.”
For more information, see Rooks v. Park‘N Fly, 2024 HRTO 1071 (CanLII).
