The Federal Public Sector Labour Relations and Employment Board has dismissed an individual grievance filed by a former employee of the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI), finding it lacked jurisdiction over the matter.
The decision concluded that the board cannot adjudicate the grievance because OSFI is a separate employer outside the core public administration.
C.Q., the former OSFI employee, challenged her August 2022 termination for unsatisfactory performance, filing a grievance on Sept. 2, 2022. After exhausting the internal grievance process, C.Q., supported by the Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada (PIPSC), sought adjudication with the labour board. However, PIPSC later withdrew its representation in October 2023, which would prove pivotal to the outcome of the case. (No reason for the withdrawal was given in the ruling.)
The employer’s main argument hinged on jurisdictional limitations outlined in Section 209 of the Federal Public Sector Labour Relations Act. OSFI contended that as a separate agency, it does not fall within the board’s purview for non-disciplinary termination matters unless it is a designated agency under the Act—a designation OSFI lacks.
The decision states: “The employer’s objections have merit, and that the Board is without jurisdiction to hear the grievance under either s. 209(1)(a) or (b).” The ruling explains that the case was initially referred under s. 209(1)(b), which addresses disciplinary terminations, but OSFI maintained (C.Q.’s) termination was for performance issues, not discipline. The board found that this distinction placed the grievance outside its jurisdiction.
In its rebuttal, OSFI cited similar cases, including Reddy v. OSFI, and argued that non-disciplinary terminations involving separate employers require specific statutory authority for adjudication, which was not present here. The employer noted that employees of OSFI, unlike those within the core public administration, do not have access to adjudication for unsatisfactory performance terminations under s. 209(1)(c), which is reserved for the core public sector.
C.Q. countered that the matter involved the interpretation of the collective agreement under s. 209(1)(a), which allows for adjudication related to collective agreement issues. She highlighted that Article 35 of the PIPSC-OSFI agreement emphasizes a collaborative performance review process between the employee and supervisor. Her counsel argued that this article was central to her case.
However, the board concluded that her argument could not proceed under s. 209(1)(a) due to the lack of bargaining agent support, as required by s. 209(2). The decision underscored this point, noting: “The grievor plainly admitted that she does not have the bargaining agent’s approval to proceed under s. 209(1)(a).” Without this approval, the board found it had no authority to hear the case.
The decision’s outcome effectively closes C.Q.’s grievance without an independent third-party review of her termination. The ruling leaves her without recourse to an adjudicative process, a situation the board acknowledged in its findings. C.Q. had argued that denying her access to adjudication deprived her of the means to contest her termination. The board, however, determined that it was bound by statutory limitations.
With this dismissal, the board ordered the file closed, concluding that it was “without jurisdiction to hear this grievance.”
C.Q.’s next steps, if any, remain unclear, as the ruling did not address alternatives outside the board’s jurisdiction.
For more information, see Quast v. Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions, 2024 FPSLREB 74 (CanLII).
