The Supreme Court of British Columbia has granted a request to transfer a wrongful dismissal case against MEG Energy Corp. to Alberta where the plaintiff had been employed. The court ruled that although the B.C. court lacked territorial competence over the case, it was appropriate to request that the Alberta Court of King’s Bench accept the proceedings.
The worker, T.H., filed the wrongful dismissal claim against MEG Energy on June 14, 2024, alleging he had been improperly terminated by the company on June 30, 2022. MEG Energy, an Alberta-based corporation, disputed the court’s jurisdiction, as T.H.’s employment was entirely within Alberta. In response, MEG sought to have the case dismissed, or alternatively stayed, arguing that the British Columbia court did not have the authority to hear the case.
There was no dispute between the parties regarding the court’s lack of jurisdiction. The central issue was whether the B.C. court should dismiss the case, as requested by MEG, or transfer it to Alberta, as requested by T.H.
In her ruling, Justice Lyster cited British Columbia’s Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act (CJPTA), which allows courts to request that a proceeding be transferred to another province if that court has both territorial and subject matter competence. Justice Lyster concluded that Alberta, as the place of employment and the jurisdiction in which MEG operates, was the appropriate forum for the case.
Jurisdictional issues
Section 3 of the CJPTA outlines the criteria under which a court in British Columbia may claim jurisdiction over a case. As none of these criteria applied to T.H.’s claim, the B.C. court had no jurisdiction over the matter. MEG argued that the court should dismiss the claim, particularly as it would now be time-barred in Alberta, where the two-year limitation period for filing had expired.
Justice Lyster acknowledged that under Alberta’s Limitations Act, the claim would indeed be statute-barred if refiled. However, the CJPTA permits transfers even in cases where a limitation period has expired, provided the transfer is requested before a dismissal is sought.
“The language of s. 14 of the CJPTA, which refers to the ‘transfer of a proceeding,’ means that the proceeding continues in the receiving province; it is not dismissed,” Justice Lyster stated in her ruling, citing the precedent of AECOM Canada Ltd. v. Fisher. In AECOM, the B.C. court similarly transferred a proceeding to Saskatchewan despite jurisdictional issues.
Arguments presented
T.H.’s counsel argued that the case should be transferred to Alberta to preserve his legal rights and avoid any unfair advantage to the defendant, particularly given that the action had been filed within the statutory timeframe in British Columbia. MEG contended that allowing such a transfer would undermine Alberta’s limitation laws, effectively granting him a “second chance” to pursue a claim that was already time-barred in that jurisdiction.
Justice Lyster dismissed MEG’s concerns, stating, “The authorities relied upon by the plaintiff establish that the court may request a transfer despite the fact that the claim, if initiated afresh in the receiving province, would be statute-barred.” She further noted that the decision to transfer was discretionary, and that MEG had not demonstrated that it would suffer any prejudice as a result of the transfer, given the relatively short time frame between T.H.’s dismissal and the filing of the claim.
Justice Lyster emphasized that T.H. had not engaged in egregious delay in filing his claim, in contrast to cases where transfers were denied due to significant delays. The court found that the filing error occurred as a result of a mistake by T.H.’s counsel, who realized the error after MEG raised jurisdictional objections.
A ‘discretionary’ transfer
Justice Lyster exercised her discretion under s. 14(2) of the CJPTA to request the transfer. She rejected MEG’s argument that allowing such transfers would create a flood of unnecessary applications in the future.
“There is no evidence that the plaintiff has acted in bad faith,” she wrote. “It seems most unlikely that the gates will open to floods of unnecessary transfer applications, and the costs attendant on them, should the court exercise its discretion in the present case.”
MEG also argued that the transfer should not be granted because it could result in cases being filed in British Columbia with the sole intent of later seeking a transfer to another jurisdiction. Justice Lyster dismissed this argument, stating, “I do not find this argument persuasive,” adding that the situation arose from counsel error rather than any improper strategy by T.H. or his legal team.
In conclusion, Justice Lyster ruled in favour of T.H., granting his request to transfer the case to Alberta and dismissing MEG’s application for dismissal. She also awarded T.H. the costs of both applications.
For more information, see Hancock v MEG Energy Corp., 2024 BCSC 1793 (CanLII).
